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APPEALING TO EMPATHY: COUNSEL’S
OBLIGATION TO PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE
FOR JUVENILES IN ADULT COURT
*

Beth Caldwell

The case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult. Retribution
is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of
youth and immaturity.
-Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)

I. INTRODUCTION
Media representations of youth as “superpredators” and “monsters” fuel public
fear of juvenile offenders.1 These depictions infiltrate public consciousness and
promote widespread misconceptions about the prevalence of youth crime and the
nature of juvenile delinquents.2 In public discourse, youth who break the law are
characterized as hardened criminals who will continue to prey upon innocent
victims unless they are incarcerated. However, a closer examination of the life
stories of young people who commit serious crimes reveals histories characterized
by trauma, victimization, and abuse – almost without exception.3 A central part of
a lawyer’s job is to uncover these stories and to tell them in a compelling way. The
effective presentation of mitigating information can pierce the initial tendency of a
judge or prosecutor to view a defendant as unequivocally deserving of retribution.
Shifting the perceptions of those with the power to make key decisions can
dramatically impact the outcome of a case. It may result in the chance to remain in
juvenile court rather than be transferred to adult court, better plea bargain offers, or
sentences focused more on rehabilitation than on long prison sentences.4

*
J.D., UCLA; Master’s in Social Welfare, UCLA. Faculty Fellow, Thomas Jefferson School of
Law. The case studies referenced in this Article are derived from my experiences as a public defender
in Los Angeles County and as the Director of Youth Development at Venice Community Housing
Corporation.
1. For a more thorough discussion of the impact of media representations of youth on juvenile
justice policy, see Beth Caldwell & Ellen C. Caldwell, “Superpredators” and “Animals”– Images and
California’s “Get Tough on Crime” Initiatives, 11 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 61 (2011).
2. For example, a 1996 poll in California indicated that sixty percent of respondents believed that
young people were responsible for most violent crime, whereas youth were actually only responsible for
thirteen percent of violent crime at the time of the survey. LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI,
BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, OFF BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN THE NEWS 4 (2001),
available at www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf.
3. For example, psychiatrist Marty Beyer reports that 48 out of 50 youth offenders he evaluated for
court had experienced severe trauma. Marty Beyer, Fifty Delinquents in Juvenile and Adult Court, 76
LN. 2 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 206, 207 (2006).
4. See generally REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE FOR
CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE (David B. Wexler ed., 2008) (discussing the importance of gathering
information about mitigation and rehabilitative options in criminal defense practice).
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The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Roper v. Simmons5 and Graham v.
Florida6 demonstrate that mitigating information about a young person accused of
a crime is important to courts. In both Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court
considered the tragic life histories of young defendants in conjunction with
adolescent development research. In Roper, the Court held that sentencing juvenile
offenders to death violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.7 Similarly, the Graham decision found the punishment of life
without the possibility of parole unconstitutional for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses.8
Mitigating information helped to frame the Court’s
understanding of the complicated developmental issues impacting juvenile
offenders in both of these landmark cases.
The Graham decision has been cited as groundbreaking in many regards9 and
has spawned academic debate regarding its implications.10 The holding of Graham
specifically prohibits sentencing juveniles not convicted of homicide offenses to
life without the possibility of parole.11 Courts are wrestling with how to apply
Graham’s holding to cases that are similar to – yet slightly different from – the
scenario the Court specifically addressed. Most of these cases relate rather
specifically to extending Graham’s narrow holding to apply to other (similar)
categories of juvenile offenders. For example, the United States Supreme Court
heard oral argument in March 2012 regarding whether sentencing juvenile
homicide offenders to life without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth
Amendment.12 In addition, the California Supreme Court is considering whether
Graham prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to lengthy prison sentences that
exceed their life expectancies because such sentences amount to de facto life
without parole.13 Although much of the litigation regarding Graham’s applicability
5. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that juveniles cannot be sentenced to death).
6. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding that juveniles convicted of non-homicide
crimes cannot be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole).
7. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
8. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2037.
9. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Juvenile Justice Reform 2.0, 20 BROOK. J. L. & POL’Y 15, 20 (2012)
(“Each of these decisions [Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; and J.D.B v. North Carolina,
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011)] has been hailed as ‘landmark,’ and together they have raised expectations
among scholars, advocates, and practitioners that a new era of reform may be emerging for youth
offenders.”); Marsha Levick, Kids Really Are Different: Looking Past Graham v. Florida, 87 Crim. L.
Rep. 664 (BNA) (July 14, 2010) (arguing that Roper and Graham “provide the framework for a
developmentally driven juvenile Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that has potentially broad
implications for the laws, policies, and practices that govern the treatment of offenders under the age of
18, particularly sentencing practices.”); Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile
Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99, 100 (2010) (“The new categorical rule established by Graham has
the potential to profoundly impact the field of juvenile justice and youth policies as a whole.”)
10. See Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply the Want of Years?,
86 TUL. L. REV. 309 (2011).
11. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
12. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (to
be argued in tandem with Jackson v. Norris, 651 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. 132 S.
Ct. 548 (2011)).
13. See People v. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review granted and opinion
superseded by 255 P.3d 951 (Cal. 2011); People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) review granted and opinion superseded by 250 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2011).
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focuses on whether the holding applies to relatively similar sentences or offenders,
the Supreme Court seems to have indicated a willingness to apply Graham’s
reasoning more broadly. In 2011, the Court held in J.D.B. v. North Carolina that
given the widely recognized differences between juveniles and adults, courts must
consider a young person’s age when determining whether an individual was in
custody for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings were required.14
Some scholars have suggested that Graham has broad ramifications for the
treatment of juvenile offenders.15 Tamar Birckhead suggests that Roper, Graham,
and J.D.B. may provide the basis for legal reforms emphasizing the need to treat
juveniles and adults differently in the criminal context and minimizing the use of
long-term incarceration of youth.16 She also notes that these cases “could support
litigation that results in rigorous client-centered representation for juveniles,” and
could require “prosecutors, judges, and probation officers [to] take into account the
youth’s brain development [and] mental and emotional state” at disposition or
sentencing hearings.17 Neelum Arya argues that several of the Court’s collateral
holdings in Graham prohibit prosecuting juveniles in adult criminal courts.18
Indeed, the Court’s reasoning in the Graham decision emphasizes the unique
position of juvenile offenders in terms of their development, diminished levels of
culpability, and capacity for change.19 One California appellate court decision –
People v. Mendez – took the Court’s reasoning to heart, resting its decision on the
principles and findings set forth in Graham.20 The Mendez court incorporated the
spirit of the Graham decision more broadly than other courts, relying on its
reasoning to find that mitigating evidence about a juvenile offender facing a
lengthy adult prison sentence must be presented at a sentencing hearing.21 This
Article builds on the innovate approach of the Mendez decision, exploring the
importance of mitigating information in juvenile defense practice and discussing
post-conviction strategies for challenging sentences imposed without adequate
consideration of mitigating evidence.
Part Two discusses the tremendous impact mitigating information can have on
the outcome of a case. It begins with a review of the mitigating information
presented about the defendants in both Roper and Graham and incorporates
examples of mitigating evidence included in recent California decisions

14. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399.
15. See Arya, supra note 9, at 102 (“This Article suggests that lawyers consider using Graham to
ensure that every child under the age of eighteen, regardless of whether the child has been given a
[juvenile life without parole] sentence, is entitled to a chance to ‘atone for his crimes and learn from his
mistakes’ so that he may ‘demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not
representative of his true character.’ Graham is not merely an extension or incremental continuation of
Roper, but provides significant fodder for a reexamination of our juvenile justice policies more broadly,
including the possibility of removing retribution as a valid goal of the criminal justice system as applied
to youth, and firmly establishing a constitutional right to rehabilitation.”) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2033).)
16. Birckhead, supra note 9, at 49-50.
17. Id. at 50.
18. Arya, supra note 9, at 152.
19. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-29.
20. People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
21. Id. at 882-84.
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interpreting Graham. Part Three sets forth the framework for potential postconviction challenges based on the argument that failure to present mitigating
evidence about a juvenile client in adult court constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel. Part Four explores alternative mechanisms for providing incarcerated
juvenile offenders the opportunity to present evidence of rehabilitation in an effort
to facilitate the type of “meaningful opportunity for release” that the Graham
decision guarantees. Part Five discusses specific skills and techniques attorneys
should develop in order to gather and present mitigating information about juvenile
clients. Drawing from therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship, as well as this
author’s background in the field of Social Welfare, this discussion presents multidisciplinary techniques that enhance the legal representation of youth.
II. THE NECESSITY OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE
A. The Role of Mitigation in Roper and Graham
Presenting Christopher Simmons and Terrence Graham as children who had
experienced victimization likely shaped the way in which the Supreme Court
viewed their cases. It is impossible to surmise the extent to which framing their
stories in the context of their traumatic childhoods influenced the Court’s decisions
in these landmark decisions. We do know, however, that storytelling can play a
powerful role in shaping legal outcomes.22 We also know that these narratives
were underdeveloped at the trial court level in both Roper and Graham. In both
cases, the trial courts imposed sentences that the Supreme Court then reversed; the
different outcomes may very well have been shaped by the mitigating information
presented at the Supreme Court level.
The trial court in Terrence Graham’s case seemed oblivious to the
dysfunctional aspects of his home life. The sentencing judge told the young man,
“as far as I can tell, you have quite a family structure. You had a lot of people who
wanted to try and help you get your life turned around. . . .”23 In contrast,
Graham’s appellate attorneys emphasized mitigating information about their client,
framing his criminal conduct within the context of his traumatic childhood.24 In the
opening brief to the Supreme Court, the discussion of the case history commences
with a two-paragraph summary of Terrence’s childhood, beginning with the fact
that he was addicted to cocaine when he was born.25 The brief explains how his
parents’ crack addictions impacted his mental health.26 Terrence was clinically
depressed and was diagnosed with ADHD, yet he did not receive the recommended
treatment because his mother advised him not to take the prescribed medication.27
His father and siblings spent time in prison and juvenile detention facilities while

22. See Philip N. Meyer, Vignettes from a Narrative Primer, 12 LEG. WRITING 229 (2006)
(discussing the importance of narrative and storytelling in legal advocacy with a particular emphasis on
criminal appeals).
23. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019.
24. Id. at 2018.
25. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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he was growing up.28 Painting a portrait of a traumatized child with little parental
support challenges the trial court’s perception of Terrence as a young man who had
been given plenty of opportunities to succeed yet, for some inexplicable reason,
chose to commit his life to engaging in crime.29 The effective presentation of
compelling mitigation evidence at the Supreme Court level may well have
contributed to the outcome of the case. Indeed, the mitigating information about
Graham’s life history was important to the Supreme Court, as evidenced by the
Court’s reference to his traumatic childhood in the first part of the decision.30 The
second paragraph of the opinion provides the petitioner’s name and birth date.31 It
then immediately provides the following information: “Graham’s parents were
addicted to crack cocaine, and their drug use persisted in his early years. Graham
was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in elementary school.
He began drinking alcohol and using tobacco at age nine and smoked marijuana at
age thirteen.”32 The opinion’s reference to Terrence Graham’s childhood
difficulties, particularly at the beginning of the opinion, signals that this
information made an impact on the Court.
In Roper, Christopher Simmons—who was seventeen years old at the time of
his offense - was sentenced to death after his attorney failed to present extensive
mitigating information at the death penalty sentencing phase.33 After he was
sentenced, a new attorney moved to set aside Simmons’s conviction and sentence
on the basis that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to present
sufficient evidence of mitigation.34 Mitigating information, including testimony by
clinical psychologists and neighbors, painted the picture of a child who was raised
in a “difficult home environment,” who struggled in school, and who was out of
school for long periods of time.35 The trial court denied the motion to set aside the
conviction and sentence, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed,36 and a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel was
denied.37 Ultimately, the Supreme Court addressed a different issue based upon the
2002 Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, which held that executing
28. Id. at 12.
29. For example, the trial court stated:
Mr. Graham, as I look back on your case, yours is really candidly a sad situation. You
had, as far as I can tell, you have quite a family structure. You had a lot of people who
wanted to try and help you get your life turned around including the court system, and
you had a judge who took the step to try and give you direction through his probation
order to give you a chance to get back onto track. And at the time you seemed through
your letters that that is exactly what you wanted to do. And I don’t know why it is that
you threw your life away. I don’t know why. . . . The only thing that I can rationalize is
that you decided that this is how you were going to lead your life and that there is nothing
that we can do for you.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019-20.
30. Id. at 2018.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 558-59 (2005).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 559.
36. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1997).
37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
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mentally retarded defendants constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.38 Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v.
Simmons did not address the lack of mitigating evidence presented at the trial court
level, the Court did consider evidence of mitigation about Christopher Simmons’s
childhood. Just as in Graham, the Court signaled that this information was
important by devoting attention to it in the opinion.39 It described expert testimony
about his “difficult home environment,” “poor school performance,” long absences
from home, and substance abuse.40 The Court also noted that “[p]art of the
submission was that Simmons was ‘very immature,’ ‘very impulsive,’ and ‘very
susceptible to being manipulated or influenced.’”41 These characteristics, which
the Court concluded are normative features of adolescence, ultimately factored
heavily into the legal analysis in the decision.42 The Court specifically found
“[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that
juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders.”43 Of particular relevance to this Article’s discussion of mitigation, the
Graham opinion cites adolescents’ immaturity and susceptibility to peer pressure as
two major differences that call for the recognition of the diminished culpability of
juvenile offenders.44 It appears that the mitigating information about Christopher’s
childhood and characteristics made an impact on the way the Court framed and
understood the issues presented in the case.
B. Mitigation in the Lives of Juveniles in Adult Court
Social science research demonstrates the existence of high levels of abuse,
victimization, trauma, and neglect in the lives of most youth offenders. This is the
type of information that can be uncovered and presented as mitigation evidence.
Exploring childhood trauma helps provide the context in which young people
commit crimes and makes their criminal behavior more understandable. One
psychiatrist who conducted developmental evaluations of fifty juvenile offenders –
some who were processed in juvenile courts and others through adult courts—
reported, “[r]egardless of age, offense, or classification as a juvenile or adult, these
50 delinquents had a high incidence of trauma and disabilities, as well as immature
thinking and unformed identities typical of adolescents.”45 Similarly, studies with
larger sample sizes consistently demonstrate widespread experiences with physical
and sexual abuse among female delinquents.46 Many young offenders also have

38. 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
39. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558-59.
40. Id. at 559.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 569-70.
43. Id. at 569.
44. Id. at 569-71.
45. Beyer, supra note 3, at 206. Notably, forty-eight of the fifty youth had “experienced severe
trauma, including repeated abuse and/or death of an important person and/or abandonment since early
childhood.” Id. at 207. Many had experienced physical or sexual abuse, and forty-two percent of these
youth had learning disabilities. Id. at 208.
46. See MEDA CHESNEY-LIND & RANDALL G. SHELDEN, GIRLS, DELINQUENCY, AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE 34-35 (2d ed.1998).
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mental health needs that have gone untreated. A study including 1,829 youth in a
the Chicago area’s Cook County juvenile detention facility found that 65% of the
boys and 71% of the girls met the criteria for being diagnosed with a psychiatric
disorder.47 A Florida study of three hundred young offenders found that 82% had a
mental health issue and 51% had potential substance abuse problems.48 Most
young offenders have experienced situations in their lives that call out for
sentencing mitigation. Motivated by a desire to uncover this information – and
equipped with the knowledge and skills to do so effectively – attorneys can
dramatically impact the outcome of these young offenders’ criminal cases by
presenting information about childhood trauma, abuse, disabilities, and mental
health issues in court.
C. The Impact of Mitigating Evidence on Judicial Decision-Making
Presenting mitigating information about a client transforms the way people
perceive the criminal act he committed. Highlighting a history of victimization
humanizes the individual and contextualizes his criminal behavior. In addition,
telling an individual’s life story complicates the tendency to demonize and blame
the individual. Rather, it exposes the range of factors that create the conditions
under which young people engage in serious crime, widening the web of people
and institutions that are responsible for these conditions and, by extension, for the
crime committed.
Judges who learn about the tragic details of a young offender’s life are likely
to be more open to rehabilitative sentencing options. People tend to support less
severe punishments when they are presented with a greater level of detail regarding
the circumstances of a crime.49 Research demonstrates that “‘[w]hen people are
told about an offender’s history of childhood abuse, for example, their desire for
severe punishment diminishes.’”50 A recent study revealed that when people were
asked to choose between trying a juvenile offender in juvenile or adult court, study
participants were much more likely to select juvenile court if they were informed
that the young person had been abused.51
Judges’ decisions are likely impacted in a similar way. Imagine, for example,
what a judge’s initial response to hearing about a sixteen-year-old teenager who
sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old neighbor might be. Characterized as a
sexual deviant who preyed upon his innocent cousin to satisfy his personal desires,
this young man did not initially engender empathy from the court. However, when
47. Elizabeth Cauffman & Thomas Grisso, Mental Health Issues Among Minority Offenders in the
Juvenile Justice System, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 390, 398 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly KempfLeonard eds., 2005).
48. Id. at 399.
49. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass
Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 175 (2011).
50. Id. at 176 (quoting JULIAN V. ROBERTS & MICHAEL J. HOUGH, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 24 (2005)).
51. Narina Nunez, Minday J. Dahl, Connie M. Tang & Brittney L. Jensen, Trial Venue Decisions in
Juvenile Cases: Mitigating and Extralegal Factors Matter, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL.
21, 37 (2007).
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the young man’s attorney uncovered Child Protective Services (CPS) records
detailing that he had been the victim of extreme physical and sexual abuse
throughout his childhood, the judge’s perspective shifted. Further details about his
childhood reinforced the profound victimization this young man experienced
himself. Records indicated that he was born with opiates in his system to a mother
who abused heroin and alcohol throughout her pregnancy. CPS records revealed
that he was removed from his parents four times prior to the age of six. When he
was three-years-old, he was left outside in the snow while his mother was on a drug
binge. At least three adult relatives sexually abused and/or sodomized the child
when he was three to six years old. Presented with detailed information about the
trauma this young man experienced at a very early age, the court was more inclined
to interpret his actions in the context of this trauma. The legal issues were thus
viewed through this lens, and a greater emphasis was placed on crafting a
rehabilitative sentence.
The Supreme Court has recognized that this type of mitigating information
may well impact the outcome of a sentence in the death penalty context.52 In
Rompilla v. Beard, the Court reasoned that mitigating evidence about the
defendant’s experiences of childhood abuse, mental impairments, parental neglect,
and developmental disability “might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal of
[his] culpability . . . and the likelihood of a different result if the evidence had gone
in is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome actually reached at
sentencing.”53 Similarly, in Wiggins v. Smith the Court stated: “Had the jury been
able to place petitioner’s excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the
scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a
different balance” with regards to the sentence imposed.54 The impact of this kind
of information is not limited to the death penalty context and would likely impact
decisions of judges and prosecutors considering other sentencing options as well.
Over the past year, a string of California cases have considered the
applicability of the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham – which specifically
prohibited sentencing juveniles to life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”)
for non-homicide crimes – to cases where juveniles are sentenced to de facto
LWOP sentences. A split of authority has emerged among appellate courts with
regards to whether Graham’s holding restricts sentencing juveniles to prison
sentences that exceed the life expectancy of the offender, and the California
Supreme Court is currently considering the issue.55 Although there are various
possible explanations for the split of authority, the presence of mitigating
information about the offender – or lack thereof – may very well have swayed the
outcomes of these cases. More importantly, courts’ consistent reference to
mitigating information about the lives of these young offenders indicates that such
52. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003).
53. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393 (citation omitted).
54. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537.
55. See People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review granted and
opinion superseded by 250 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2011).. Other state court decisions on this issue, including
Georgia, Arizona, and Florida, have limited Graham’s application to sentences specifically labeled as
“life without parole” and have declined to extend the holding to limit the imposition of term-of-years
sentences. See, e.g., Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
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information matters.
The California cases holding that non-homicide juvenile offenders may not be
sentenced to prison terms exceeding their life expectancies incorporate mitigating
information about the offenders into their opinions, demonstrating that courts have
found this evidence to be important to their understanding of these cases. In
People v. J.I.A., an appellate court considered whether sentencing a juvenile to fifty
years to life plus two consecutive life terms for non-homicide convictions
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.56 The court dedicated a substantial
portion of its analysis to a discussion of the defendant’s “extremely abusive
childhood,” which included sexual abuse at the age of five or six.57 Referencing
Graham’s consideration of the defendant’s background, including parental neglect,
his mental health diagnoses, and his history of substance abuse, the court concluded
that J.A.’s “family life and upbringing are also highly relevant to the analysis.”58
In addition, the court emphasized the fact that J.A. was “mentally retarded” or, at
the very least, of “substandard intelligence.”59 Based upon this information, the
court concluded that the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment because “he is
not eligible for parole until about the time he is expected to die.”60 The court
therefore modified the sentence to run concurrently rather than consecutively,
thereby allowing that he would be eligible for parole when he is fifty-six years old,
after serving forty-two and a half years in prison.61
Similarly, an appellate court reversed the sentence of Antonio de Jesus Nuñez,
concluding that a sentence of one-hundred and seventy-five years to life is a de
facto sentence of life without parole and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment
under Graham.62 The opinion emphasized mitigating evidence about Antonio’s
childhood. Specifically, the opinion recounts “the post-traumatic stress disorder”
that was “informed by his trauma history of having been shot, his brother being
shot and killed, his life being threatened, and seeing people shot and killed in his
neighborhood.”63 The court went on to explain that Antonio’s brother was shot
while attempting to help Antonio.64 The opinion noted that Antonio had been
diagnosed with major depression, was amenable to treatment in juvenile hall, and
suffered from “‘adverse developmental factors including early alcohol and drug
use, neglect and abuse, and possible cognitive defects.’”65 Mitigating evidence
clearly impacted the court, as evidenced by the substantial attention devoted to
these issues in its opinion.
In another California appellate case, the court declined to find an Eighth
Amendment violation when a fifteen year old was sentenced to thirty-five years
56. People v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review granted and opinion
superseded by 260 P.3d 283 (Cal. 2011).
57. Id. at 146, 152 (describing additional details about physical, emotional, and sexual abuse he
suffered).
58. Id. at 152.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 149.
61. Id. at 154.
62. In re Nuñez, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
63. Id. at 261.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 252.
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and eight months to life, noting that “the paucity of the record in this matter fails to
support an as applied challenge to defendant’s sentence” because essentially no
mitigating information was presented.66 Specifically, the court noted that “the
record contains no information about defendant’s upbringing”67 and concluded,
“[w]ithout sufficient mitigating evidence about defendant, there is nothing to
counterbalance the fact that the robberies, and the use of a firearm during each of
the robberies, present a clear danger to society justifying a lengthy sentence.”68
Rather than reversing the sentence and requiring the trial court to consider
mitigating information in determining the appropriate sentence, as in Mendez, the
court ruled that the evidence presented did not render his sentence cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment.69 The court suggested instead that he could
bring a writ of habeas corpus, which would provide a remedy “should he be able to
garner evidence beyond the record provided on appeal.”70
People v. Mendez emphasizes the importance of presenting mitigating
evidence at a sentencing hearing of a juvenile offender in light of Graham’s
reasoning.71 In that case, the court concluded that a sentence of eighty-four years
to life for a juvenile not convicted of homicide constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment because it amounts to a “de facto LWOP sentence.”72 The opinion
devoted substantial attention to the lack of mitigating evidence presented by
counsel in this case, stating:
We are particularly troubled here by the fact that the record is silent as to
Mendez’s personal and family life and upbringing. This is important
because the particular characteristics of the offender are relevant to the
harshness of the penalty and a defendant’s culpability. The record is silent
as to the reasons Mendez joined a gang in the first place, any drug use,
mental health issues, educational level, etc. It may well be the case that
there were mitigating factors that would diminish his culpability and
expose the harshness of his sentence. But we simply have no such
knowledge here. And it does not appear that the trial court had any such
evidence before imposing consecutive sentences.73
The opinion references the Supreme Court’s description of Graham’s childhood,
explaining that the Court considered “that his parents were drug addicts, that he had
been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in elementary school,
and that he began drinking at age 9 and smoking marijuana at age 13.”74 Although
Mendez does not interpret Graham to require counsel to present mitigating
evidence, it implies that the absence of such information significantly impacts the
Court’s ability to analyze whether the sentence at issue constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. The decision highlights the importance of mitigation on the
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

People v. Roldan, 2011 WL 3873858, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2011).
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5.
People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 884-85 (2010).
Id. at 882.
Id. at 884-85 (citations omitted).
Id. at 885 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010)).
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outcome of cases where juveniles are subject to sentencing in adult courts.
Presenting mitigating evidence humanizes individual defendants by presenting
a counter-narrative to the common assumption that young offenders are “superpredators.” Mitigation evidence is often referred to as “empathy evidence” by
defense attorneys who seek to humanize their clients in the eyes of judges and
juries.75 This humanization is particularly important given that the vast majority of
youth facing sentencing in adult courts are youth of color,76 a population that is
systematically dehumanized and demonized in popular discourse.77
III. RAISING AN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM BASED ON FAILURE
TO PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires counsel to
provide effective representation.78 In the context of juvenile defendants, I argue
that mitigating evidence must be presented in order to meet this standard. Failure
to present such evidence can give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
on direct appeal or through a writ of habeas corpus. This Part draws upon a
strategy employed by Stanford Law School’s Criminal Defense Clinic in order to
obtain post-conviction relief for people sentenced under California’s Three Strikes
Law.79 In the same way that the Stanford Clinic brings ineffective assistance of
counsel claims to challenge Three Strikes sentences on the basis that counsel failed
to present mitigating evidence,80 post-conviction attorneys could challenge the
sentences of juveniles sentenced to lengthy adult prison sentences.
Under Strickland v. Washington, an attorney is deemed ineffective when his
performance falls below a reasonable standard, as defined by professional norms,
and when the attorney’s failures resulted in prejudice.81 Although presenting
mitigating evidence is not universally required of attorneys in non-death penalty
sentencing hearings,82 the case is stronger for juvenile defendants. Professional
75. Thomas W. Brewer, Race and Jurors’ Receptivity to Mitigation in Capital Cases: The Effect of
Jurors’, Defendants’, and Victims’ Race in Combination, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 529, 532 (2004).
76. In 2010, over fifty-five percent of juveniles sentenced for felonies in adult court were Hispanic
and over twenty-nine percent were Black. KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 2010, at 42 tbl.31 (2011). Only 10.5% of juveniles sentenced for felonies in
adult court were White. Id. A national study concluded that “African American youth were
overrepresented and White youth were underrepresented in cases waived to adult court” for all types of
offenses. EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (2002).
77. See Caldwell & Caldwell, supra note 1.
78. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
79. Michael Romano, Striking Back: Using Death Penalty Cases to Fight Disproportionate
Sentences Imposed Under California’s Three Strikes Law, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 311, 316 (2010).
80. Id. at 318.
81. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”).
82. Criminal defense attorneys arguably are required to introduce mitigating information at
sentencing. See Tamar M. Meekins, You Can Teach Old Defenders New Tricks: Sentencing Lessons
from Specialty Courts, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 4, at 144, 145 (explaining that a
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norms governing juvenile delinquency practice emphasize counsel’s duty to obtain
and present such information in juvenile courts. In death penalty cases, counsel is
ineffective when she fails to adequately gather and present mitigating information
about the defendant at the sentencing phase of the trial.83 The Stanford Clinic
pursues post-conviction reversals of sentences imposed under California’s Three
Strikes Law on the ground that failure to present mitigating evidence at sentencing
hearings in Three Strikes cases similarly constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel.84 Comparing Three Strikes sentencing hearings to death penalty
sentencing, the Clinic has succeeded in bringing ineffective assistance of counsel
claims due to trial counsel’s failure to adequately discover and present mitigating
information at sentencing.85 Similarly, sentencing hearings for juvenile offenders
facing substantial prison sentences in adult court arguably require counsel to
uncover and present mitigating information.
A. Establishing an Obligation to Present Mitigating Evidence
1. Counsel’s Requirement to Present Mitigating Evidence in Capital Cases
In the death penalty context, courts are constitutionally required to consider
“the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense.”86 Accordingly, failure to adequately find and present
mitigating evidence during the penalty phase constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel.87 A series of three major Supreme Court cases, each of which held an
attorney ineffective for inadequately presenting mitigating evidence during the
penalty phase of a capital case, have established relatively high standards for
requiring attorneys to uncover mitigating evidence in death penalty cases.88
Traditionally, the Court has distinguished death penalty cases from other criminal
cases, thus limiting counsel’s burden of presenting mitigating evidence at
sentencing to death penalty cases.89 In Williams v. Taylor, the Court recognized
criminal defense attorney is “required to marshal the facts, introduce evidence of mitigating
circumstances, and assist the defendant in presenting his or her sentencing requests.”).
83. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003);
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (“even when a capital defendant’s family members and the
defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make
reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely
on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.”).
84. Romano, supra note 79, at 318.
85. Id.
86. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). “While the prevailing practice of
individualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a
constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)
(plurality opinion).
87. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
88. Williams, 529 U.S. 362; Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510; Rompilla, 545 U.S. 374.
89. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (“This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty
of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality,
differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.
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that the defendant had “a constitutionally protected right [ ] to provide the jury with
the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to
offer.”90 In that case, trial counsel failed to uncover “extensive records graphically
describing Williams’s nightmarish childhood.”91 Specifically, trial counsel failed
to present evidence
that Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of
Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly
beaten by his father, that he had been committed to the custody of the
social services bureau for two years during his parents’ incarceration
(including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents
were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody.92
Further, trial counsel did not present evidence that he was borderline mentally
retarded, had limited schooling, and demonstrated helpful, non-violent behavior
while in prison.93 The Supreme Court concluded that “trial counsel did not fulfill
their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s
background,”94 and this failure to present this mitigating evidence “raised ‘a
reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been
different’ if competent counsel had presented and explained the significance of all
the available evidence.”95 The Court’s conclusion that the attorney failed to
adequately investigate rested upon the commentary accompanying the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice regarding counsel’s duty to investigate.96 These
standards govern defense counsel generally and are not limited to capital cases.
Similarly, in Wiggins the defendant suffered a tragic childhood characterized
by repeated episodes of physical and sexual abuse perpetrated by various adults in
his life.97 Trial counsel failed to uncover or present this information, and Wiggins
Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”).
90. Williams, 529 U.S. at 393.
91. Id. at 395.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 399 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
96. Id. at 396 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1, cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed. 1980)).
97. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 516-18 (2003). A social worker hired by post-conviction
counsel reported:
[P]etitioner’s mother, a chronic alcoholic, frequently left Wiggins and his siblings homes
alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips and garbage. Mrs.
Wiggins’ abusive behavior included beating the children for breaking into the kitchen,
which she often kept locked. She had sex with men while her children slept in the same
bed and, on one occasion, forced petitioner’s hand against a hot stove burner—an
incident that led to petitioner’s hospitalization. At the age of six, the State placed
Wiggins in foster care. Petitioner’s first and second foster mother abused him physically
and, as petitioner explained to [the social worker], the father in his second foster home
repeatedly molested and raped him. At age 16, petitioner ran away from his foster home
and began living on the streets. He returned intermittently to additional foster homes,
including one in which the foster mother’s sons allegedly gang-raped him on more than
one occasion. After leaving the foster care system, Wiggins entered a Job Corps program
and was allegedly sexually abused by his supervisor.”
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was sentenced to death.98 The Supreme Court referenced the standard practice of
preparing social history reports in capital cases in Maryland at the time of the
sentencing, and concluded that counsel’s preparation fell short of the standard
practice in Maryland as well as the standards for death penalty cases articulated by
the American Bar Association.99 While the Williams opinion relied on ABA
guidelines regarding criminal defense practice more generally,100 Wiggins drew
upon more specific professional standards governing attorneys in capital cases.101
The Court concluded that counsel’s failure to obtain this information “did not
reflect reasonable professional judgment,”102 and there was a “reasonable
probability” the jury “would have returned with a different sentence” if it had been
presented with this mitigating evidence.103
In Rompilla – the most recent of the string of Supreme Court decisions finding
ineffective assistance of counsel based upon failure to adequately present
mitigating information in capital cases – the Court relied upon the American Bar
Association Standard 4-4.1 (governing a criminal defense attorney’s duty to
investigate) to conclude that Rompilla’s attorney’s investigation fell short of that
which would be required under professional norms.104 The Court also referenced
ABA guidelines related specifically to defense counsel’s obligations in capital
cases.105 As in Williams and Wiggins, the Court concluded that counsel’s
inadequate investigation – failure to look in the file regarding his prior convictions,
which the prosecution relied upon to show aggravation – obscured mitigating
evidence that would likely have led to a different outcome in the case.106
Specifically, the defense failed to uncover evidence that his “IQ was in the
mentally retarded range” and that he showed signs of schizophrenia.107 Further,
counsel failed to uncover details of Rompilla’s traumatic childhood, including
exposure to alcohol as a fetus, severe beatings by his father, exposure to domestic
violence in the home, and his being locked “in a small wire mesh dog pen that was
filthy and excrement filled.”108
Defendants are not constitutionally entitled to an “individualized determination
that punishment is ‘appropriate’” outside of the death penalty context.109
Accordingly, courts are not required to consider mitigating factors prior to
sentencing except in capital cases.110 Even though there is no constitutional
requirement that courts consider mitigating evidence, such evidence is frequently
presented by defense counsel in discretionary sentencing hearings. Developing
Id. at 516-17 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 516.
99. Id. at 524.
100. Williams, 529 U.S. at 396.
101. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
102. Id. at 534.
103. Id. at 536.
104. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005).
105. Id. at 387-88 n.7.
106. Id. at 393.
107. Id. at 391-93.
108. Id. at 391-92.
109. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991).
110. Id. at 994-95.
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such information is important because, in addition to impacting sentencing, it may
help to secure a better plea bargain. Despite the importance of mitigation and the
professional standards that recognize attorneys’ responsibility to develop such
information, courts do not generally deem counsel ineffective for failing to develop
mitigating evidence in non-capital cases. In contrast to death penalty cases where –
as discussed above – attorneys must present mitigating evidence at sentencing,
counsel is not clearly required to develop such evidence in non-capital cases. In
Strickland, the Court distinguished capital sentencing from “ordinary sentencing,”
indicating that ordinary sentencing hearings may require a different standard for
counsel because such hearings may be informal and “involve standardless
discretion in the sentence.”111 The more formal nature of capital sentencing
hearings renders them more similar to trials and, according to Strickland, requires
higher standards for counsel.112 However, under Strickland’s standard requiring
attorneys to provide representation that is reasonable under professional norms,
counsel is arguably obligated to similarly present mitigating information in noncapital sentencing hearings. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice – which are
often relied upon to establish professional norms by which to measure the
reasonableness of counsel’s representation – require all criminal defense counsel to
investigate mitigating evidence.113 According to the commentary accompanying
these standards, “[t]he lawyer has a substantial and important role to perform in
raising mitigating factors both to the prosecutor initially and to the court at
sentencing. . . . Information concerning the defendant’s background, education,
employment record, mental and emotional stability, family relationships, and the
like, will be relevant, as will mitigating circumstances surrounding the commission
of the offense itself.”114 However, courts are generally reluctant to find counsel
ineffective for failing to adequately prepare evidence of mitigation in non-capital
cases. For example, the Ninth Circuit refuses to review habeas petitions based
upon ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing hearings.115
2. The Stanford Clinic Model
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon failure to present
mitigating information at sentencing hearings generally fail when the defendant is
not facing the death penalty.116 However, in spite of this deeply entrenched “death
is different” approach, the Stanford Clinic has successfully argued that an attorney
is ineffective if she fails to present mitigating evidence in a California Three
Strikes sentencing hearing.117 By analogizing Three Strikes sentencing hearings to
the death penalty context, the Stanford Clinic has convinced California courts that
failure to present mitigating information at sentencing hearings for Three Strikes

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
Id. at 686-87.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1, cmt. at 183 (3d ed. 1993).
Romano, supra note 79, at 339.
See id.
Id. at 317-18.
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cases constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.118
California’s Three Strikes Law requires that a defendant be sentenced to
twenty-five years to life for committing any felony if he has two prior convictions
for “serious” or “violent” offenses.119 The twenty-five to life sentence is
mandatory, but there is one exception: judges are permitted to dismiss a prior strike
conviction “in the interest of justice,” thus allowing them some discretion not to
impose a third strike sentence.120 The Clinic has convinced California courts that
sentencing for a third strike offense is similar to a death penalty sentencing because
courts are required to consider personal information about a defendant in order to
determine whether to dismiss a prior strike conviction just as courts must consider
characteristics of an offender in determining whether to sentence him to death.121
The California Supreme Court has established that courts must consider “the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects” in determining whether to
dismiss a prior conviction such that an enhanced sentence would not apply under
California’s Three Strikes Law.122 The Clinic has successfully argued that in order
to adequately consider these issues, courts must be presented with mitigating
information about a client’s background. For example, it has uncovered and
presented information about defendants’ histories of mental health issues, abuse
and neglect suffered as children, exposure to parental drug addictions or
alcoholism, prior suicide attempts, and evidence of developmental disabilities that
was not presented at sentencing.123 California courts have found trial counsel
ineffective for failing to present this evidence and have accordingly reversed
twelve Three Strikes sentences.124 This is a unique approach given the general
reluctance of courts to consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating
to sentencing hearings outside of the capital context.
3. Mitigation Requirement for Juveniles Sentenced in Adult Courts
Similarly, attorneys should be obligated to present mitigating evidence at
sentencing hearings for juveniles, particularly those who are sentenced in adult
courts. Juveniles who commit crimes are generally prosecuted in juvenile
delinquency courts, where professional standards emphasize the importance of
counsel’s presenting mitigating information at disposition hearings—the juvenile
court equivalent of sentencing hearings.125 Juveniles who are prosecuted in adult
courts are different from adults in significant ways, and those differences render the
118. Id. at 318 (“[t]o date, Clinic students have won reversals of twelve life sentences imposed under
the Three Strikes law for minor crimes.”).
119. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170.12 (West 2012).
120. People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 649 (Cal. 1996); People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429, 436 (Cal.
1998).
121. Romano, supra note 79, at 340.
122. Romero, 917 P.2d at 649.
123. Romano, supra note 79, at 338.
124. Id.
125. See INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING
TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES § 9.2(b)(ii) (1980) (“[w]hether or not social and other reports are
readily available, the lawyer has a duty independently to investigate the client’s circumstances,
including such factors as previous history, family relations, economic condition and any other
information relevant to disposition.”).
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presentation of mitigating evidence critically important in their sentencing
hearings, particularly because these young offenders may be faced with spending
the rest of their lives in prison. The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham rests
heavily upon the Court’s finding that juveniles are fundamentally different from
adults, and normative characteristics of adolescents render them less culpable than
adults.126 Graham’s holding does not address claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, nor does it directly address the issue of presenting mitigating evidence
about juvenile offenders. However, the Court’s reasoning emphasizes mitigating
information about juvenile offenders as a class, reinforcing the importance of
considering evidence of mitigation in juvenile sentencing. The Court explained,
“[t]he judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics,
along with the severity of the punishment in question.”127 Although the decision
focuses on normative characteristics that apply to adolescents as a category, the
reasoning illustrates that considering a juvenile’s diminished culpability is material
to determining the appropriate sentence.
In Graham, the Court held that a particular sentence – life without the
possibility of parole – is unconstitutional as applied to non-homicide juvenile
offenders because of their diminished culpability.128 Similarly, courts should
consider information that may diminish the culpability of an individual juvenile
defendant such that a less severe sentence would be appropriate. The approach the
Graham court takes in analyzing the behavior of juvenile offenders emphasizes the
fundamental importance of considering the “lessened culpability” of juveniles
based upon neurological and psychological characteristics of adolescents.129
According to the Court, “[i]t remains true that ‘from a moral standpoint it would be
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater
possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.’”130 The
Court emphasized the “limited moral culpability” of juvenile offenders.131 This
reasoning about fundamental characteristics of juveniles cannot be logically
restricted to apply only to the analysis of life without parole sentences; the Court
discusses adolescents generally. The Graham decision created a categorical rule
prohibiting the sentence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses such that individual consideration of mitigating information this
particular class of offenders would be irrelevant. However, the only way to take
into account the “limited moral culpability” of juvenile offenders facing other
sentences would be for courts to consider the factors that impact an individual’s
development and, therefore, their culpability. For example, it would be impossible
to evaluate the culpability of a fourteen-year-old accused of committing sex
offenses without considering information about the offender’s sexual victimization
as a child. Mitigating information is the key to assessing diminished culpability
and, therefore, must be considered in order for sentencing decisions to remain
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
Id.
Id. at 2034.
Id. at 2026-27.
Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
Id. at 2030.
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consistent with the fundamental reasoning of Graham.
State appellate courts have reached different conclusions as to whether
mitigating information about juvenile offenders must be considered in sentencing
hearings under Graham. As previously discussed, in People v. Mendez, a
California appellate court interpreted Graham’s reliance on mitigating information
and research on adolescent development to require consideration of mitigating
evidence about a juvenile defendant facing a lengthy prison sentence at his
sentencing.132 The court reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to
reconsider the sentence; in accord with the opinion, the reconsideration would
require the consideration of any mitigating information about Mendez’s
background.133 In contrast, an appellate court in Texas recently held that trial
courts do not have the duty “to ensure that all mitigating evidence is fully
developed during sentencing” for juvenile offenders.134 The Texas court took the
opposite approach of the California court, focusing on the specific holding of
Graham rather than its reasoning. The court explained that “discussion of a
constitutional rule regarding mitigating evidence is conspicuously absent from the
decision, and we do not find merit in the argument that Graham implicitly
established” an obligation to consider mitigating evidence.135 While the California
court focused on the reasoning in Graham, the Texas court emphasized the limited
holding of the case. Graham’s emphasis on the relevance of the diminished
culpability of adolescents is consistent with requiring counsel to present mitigating
evidence relating to a juvenile offender’s diminished culpability.
Counsel should be required to present mitigating evidence about juvenile
clients because their cases are unique. Although counsel has previously only been
required to present mitigating evidence in death penalty cases according to the
“death is different” principle, the Graham decision stands for the proposition that
juveniles are different too.136 Juveniles sentenced to life in prison face longer
sentences than their adult counterparts because their sentences begin at a younger
age.137 Thus, they face harsher penalties due to their youth. In addition, they are
more likely to change because they are in a process of maturation.138 Their
characters are not yet established, and most will not continue to commit crimes as
adults.139 Under this reasoning, it is particularly important for courts to consider
evidence of rehabilitation or alternative sentences that would promote such
rehabilitation. Due to the unique situation of juvenile offenders, the Court in
Graham applied an analytical framework previously reserved for death penalty
cases to a non-death sentence—juvenile life without parole.140 In taking this
approach, the Court blurred the line that distinguished the rules for death penalty
cases from other criminal cases, particularly those involving juvenile defendants.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 884-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
Id. at 885-86.
Welch v. State, 335 S.W.3d 376, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Id. at 381.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
Id. at 2028.
Id. at 2026-27.
Id. at 2026.
Id. at 2032.
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According to the same reasoning, ineffective assistance of counsel claims for
juvenile offenders should arguably be analyzed under the standards previously
reserved for capital cases because mitigating evidence is necessary to make
appropriate sentencing decisions in both realms.
The type of mitigating evidence counsel is required to present in the
sentencing phase for capital cases is the same type of evidence courts typically
consider in sentencing juvenile offenders, further reinforcing the similarities
between capital sentencing and sentencing of juvenile offenders. In the capital
context, attorneys are responsible for gathering evidence about a defendant’s
childhood, mental capacity, health, history of substance abuse, experiences of
abuse or neglect, and developmental disabilities.141 The juvenile cases previously
discussed in this Article have incorporated similar information into their analysis.
This is the same type of information that professional standards regarding criminal
defense of juveniles require counsel to obtain.142 It is incompetent for counsel to
fail to present this information to a judge charged with determining a young
person’s fate.
B. Establishing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Deficient Representation
Under Strickland, an attorney is “deficient” or ineffective if his representation
“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as dictated “under prevailing
professional norms.”143 The Supreme Court has considered the American Bar
Association guidelines for defense counsel in assessing reasonable standards of
representation in the death penalty context.144 Professional standards for the
representation of juvenile offenders generally provide that presenting mitigating
evidence is a critical aspect of effectively representing this population.145 The
American Bar Association’s Center for Criminal Justice has published a set of
Juvenile Justice Standards including recommendations for the obligations of
counsel. Under these standards, counsel “has a duty independently to investigate
the client’s circumstances, including such factors as previous history, family
relations, economic condition, and any other information relevant to
disposition.”146 Furthermore, the Standards provide that “[t]he lawyer should seek
to secure the assistance of psychiatric, psychological, medical or other expert
personnel needed for purposes of evaluation, consultation, or testimony with

141. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390-93 (2005).
142. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993).
143. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
144. Id. at 688-89 (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards
and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable . . .”). See also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387.
145. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993).
146. INST. JUDICIAL ADMIN. & ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO
COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES § 9.2(b) (1980). Although these standards may be crafted with juvenile
delinquency proceedings in mind, the same standards should apply for the representation of juveniles
whose cases are processed through adult court because the same developmental issues apply to all
adolescents regardless of the court.
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respect to formation of a dispositional plan.”147 In addition, the ABA guidelines
for representing adults require counsel to “collect information concerning the
defendant’s background, education, employment record, mental and emotional
stability, family relationship, ‘and the like.’”148
Similarly, the National Juvenile Defender Center interprets the duties of
competence and diligence to require that juvenile defense attorneys are “wellversed in the areas of child and adolescent development” and have a “working
knowledge,” and contact with experts, in “collateral consequences” of conviction,
special education, abuse and neglect, cultural competence, and mental health.149 In
addition, these standards indicate that competent juvenile defense counsel should
consult “with mitigation specialists, social workers, and mental health, special
education, and other experts to develop a plan consistent with the client’s expressed
interests” at the disposition hearing.150 Counsel should also “prepare[] and
present[] the court with a creative, comprehensive, strengths-based, individualized
disposition alternative consistent with the client’s expressed interests.”151 Although
these standards relate to the representation of juveniles in delinquency court, they
are germane to representing juvenile offenders in adult court.
Unfortunately, juvenile defense attorneys regularly and systematically fail to
meet these standards.152 Many court-appointed attorneys are inundated with cases,
leaving little time for in-depth preparation of each client’s case.153 There are
unique challenges to representing youth, including communication difficulties and
challenges to earning clients’ trust. In the Graham decision, the Supreme Court
discussed “special difficulties encountered by counsel in juvenile
representation.”154 Specifically, the Court noted that juveniles “are less likely than
adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense” due to a lack of
trust and more “limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles
of the institutional actors within it.”155 This is a problem among juvenile court
attorneys that is likely more pronounced for attorneys in adult courts, who likely
have few juvenile clients. In addition, some attorneys do not routinely appoint

147. Id. § 9.2(c).
148. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 cmt. (3d ed. 1993).
149. ROBIN WALKER STERLING, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDERS CTR., ROLE OF JUVENILE DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DELINQUENCY COURT
14
(2009),
available
at
www.njdc.info/pdf/
njdc_role_of_counsel_book.pdf.
150. Id. at 18.
151. Id.
152. See Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 792 (2010).
153. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC
DEFENSE 10 (2011), available at www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/
system_overload_final.pdf (reporting on nationally recommended limits on caseloads of public
defenders and concluding that “according to the most recent Census of Public Defense Offices (CPDO)
conducted by the DOJ, 73 percent of county-based public defender offices lacked enough attorneys to
meet these national caseload standards, while 23 percent of offices had less than half of the necessary
attorneys to meet caseload standards.”).
154. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
155. Id.
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experts to assist with developing the defense.156 Studies have found that juvenile
delinquency “[a]ttorneys rarely obtained educational records, mental health
records, or other information from the community about their clients for the
disposition hearing.”157 Requiring attorneys to develop and present mitigating
evidence in cases where juveniles are tried in adult court may force the criminal
justice system to resolve some of the endemic problems plaguing the representation
of youth. At the very least, this standard would ensure that all youth have the
opportunity to present mitigating evidence in the trial court or, if not, through postconviction remedies.
2. Prejudice: Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence Impacted the Outcome
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, there must be a
reasonable probability that the failures of counsel contributed to the sentence that
was imposed.158 In its Three Strikes litigation, the Stanford Clinic argues that
mitigating evidence may place a defendant outside the spirit of the Three Strikes
law such that it should not apply.159 Similarly, in the juvenile context, counsel
could argue that mitigating information about a juvenile defendant is essential to
assessing the diminished culpability of an offender and is therefore required under
the spirit of Graham, which emphasizes the importance of considering the
diminished culpability of youth offenders in determining an appropriate
punishment.
Supreme Court precedent in the capital arena demonstrates that the
presentation of mitigating information is likely to impact sentencing decisions. In
the same way that this information is likely to impact the decision of whether to
impose the death penalty, it is logical to assume that mitigating evidence likely
would impact other sentencing decisions. Judges often have wide discretion in
selecting the term of years to impose. Mitigating information could impact the
length of the sentence a judge chooses. In addition, juvenile defendants in criminal
court may argue that this evidence demonstrates that they should have been
remanded to juvenile court. Many states provide some provision for remand to
juvenile court, or for more lenient sentencing under “youthful offender” provisions
in adult courts. Remand to juvenile court or sentencing as a “youthful offender”
has major implications for the length of sentence that can be imposed. For
example, a young person can be incarcerated up to the age of twenty-five in
California’s juvenile court system whereas that same youth could be imprisoned for
156. See, e.g., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & NEW ENG. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MAINE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 35-36 (2003), available at www.njdc.info/pdf/mereport.pdf (“One indication of the lack
of zealous advocacy discerned in this study was the universal recognition by district court judges that
many juvenile defenders were not petitioning for available court funds for expert assessments. Given
the extremely high rate of mental health problems exhibited in this population, the juvenile defense bar’s
insistence on the use of court-ordered and/or independent evaluations and expert testimony should be
staples of court hearings: they are not.”).
157. Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court–A Promise
Unfulfilled, 44 No.3 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (2008).
158. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
159. Romano, supra note 79, at 336-37.

2012]

APPEALING TO EMPATHY

413

life through adult court. Further, mitigating evidence is likely to be useful during
the plea bargaining process and may result in the prosecution offering to reduce the
charge to a less serious offense, and to a reduced prison sentence. Mitigating
information is recognized to have a major impact on death penalty decisions, as
well as on dispositions in juvenile court. It would likely have a similar impact on
the outcomes of juvenile cases in adult courts.
3. Vehicles for Raising Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Requiring the presentation of mitigating evidence as a component of effective
representation would facilitate post-conviction review of the cases where juveniles
are sentenced as adults by creating a clear rule establishing that counsel who fail to
present evidence of mitigation are deemed ineffective. These claims would
typically arise through a direct appeal, or by a writ of habeas corpus. Procedurally,
appellate counsel could raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel based
upon trial counsel’s failure to adequately research and present mitigating evidence
on direct appeal. If the timeline for appeal has already expired, the claim could be
raised through a writ of habeas corpus.160 The procedures would be similar to those
employed in death penalty appeals where the right to present mitigating evidence,
and counsel’s obligation to effectively gather such evidence, are clearly recognized.
This would ensure greater equity in the representation juvenile offenders receive
because it would provide recourse in those cases where a juvenile’s attorney does
not adequately present crucial mitigating information. This is particularly
important because juveniles may be less capable of advocating for themselves due
to their relative immaturity, making them more likely to be prejudiced by attorneys
who do not adequately represent their interests.161
IV. CREATING POST-CONVICTION OPPORTUNITIES TO REVIEW SENTENCES IN LIGHT
OF REHABILITATION
Raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal or through
habeas corpus writs is not the only way to incorporate the spirit of Graham into
post-conviction review. It may also be possible to file motions for reconsideration
of a sentence after sufficient time has passed to demonstrate rehabilitation.
Graham requires that juveniles sentenced for non-homicide offenses have a
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”162 While making it clear that the opportunity for release is required,
the Supreme Court did not provide additional details regarding what type of
opportunity the Constitution requires. The Graham decision made clear that courts
may not determine “at the outset that [juveniles convicted of non-homicide
offenses] never will be fit to reenter society.”163 However, the Supreme Court left
it up to states “to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance” with its
160. Writs of habeas corpus can raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See, e.g., In re Avena,
909 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1996).
161. Graham recognizes juveniles’ capacity of change and rehabilitation. Graham v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2011, 2028-30 (2010).
162. Id. at 2030.
163. Id.
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opinion.164 Creative attorneys could engage in post-conviction advocacy to have
sentences reviewed in light of evidence of rehabilitation. This may lead to
legislative changes that create standardized procedures for sentence
reconsideration.
California’s Senate Bill 9, which has not been passed as of the publication of
this Article, proposes a new procedure whereby all juveniles sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole would have the opportunity to petition the court to
reduce their sentences after they have served fifteen years in prison.165 Essentially,
it proposes a new post-conviction process whereby juvenile offenders would have
an opportunity to petition the sentencing court “for recall and resentencing.”166
According to the proposed legislation, the petition must include a statement
regarding the offender’s “remorse and work towards rehabilitation.”167 The
sentencing court would review the petition to determine whether to hold a hearing
to reconsider the original sentence.168 If a hearing is granted, the court would
consider factors relating to the diminished culpability of the offender due to the
circumstances surrounding the offense, a lack of criminal history, evidence or
rehabilitation while in custody, and mitigating information, such as developmental
disabilities, psychological or physical trauma, and participation in the crime with
an adult co-defendant (who may have negatively influenced the younger codefendant to participate in the crime).169
If passed, this law would only apply to those who have been sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole.170 The bill does not address those youth who have
been sentenced to lengthy prison sentences but who—technically—still have a
chance to be released on parole. Given Graham’s emphasis on the hope for
redemption of juvenile offenders, such a procedure would make sense for all
juveniles sentenced to lengthy prison sentences. Even if new procedures are not
designed to address this issue, attorneys may be able to rely upon existing law to
bring requests for sentencing review to court. The procedure will vary from state
164. Id..
165. S. B. 9, 2011-12 (Cal. 2010).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. As currently written, the legislation states that a hearing to reconsider the sentence would be
granted if the sentencing court determines one of the following facts is established by a preponderance
of the evidence in the defendant’s petition:
(i) The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and abetting
murder provisions of law. (ii) The defendant does not have juvenile felony
adjudications for assault or other felony crimes with a significant potential for
personal harm to victims prior to the offense for which the sentence is being
considered for recall. (iii) The defendant committed the offense with at least one
adult codefendant. (iv) The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate
rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to,
availing himself or herself of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs,
if those programs have been available at his or her classification level and facility,
using self-study for self-improvement, or showing evidence of remorse.
Id.
169. Id. The sentencing court may consider, for example, whether the minor was convicted of
murder on a felony murder theory, or as an accomplice. Id.
170. Id.
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to state, but counsel could rely upon state provisions that allow for commutations
of sentences by state governors and may offer evidence of rehabilitation in such
applications.171
However, this avenue is extremely limited given that
commutations of sentence are rarely granted.
V. PRESENTING MITIGATING EVIDENCE: THE ART OF GATHERING INFORMATION
There is a growing body of work rooted in the theory of therapeutic
jurisprudence that discusses the importance of criminal defense attorneys
thoroughly developing mitigating information and a “rehabilitation-oriented
packet” to use in plea negotiations or a sentencing hearing.172 Mitigation has long
been recognized as a fundamental concept in criminal law and as a critical aspect of
effective representation of juvenile offenders. However, many attorneys do not
adequately present such evidence. There are various explanations for this failure
on the part of some attorneys. First, the vast majority of court-appointed attorneys
and public defenders have too many cases to devote substantial time to gathering
mitigating evidence.173 Some defense attorneys would consider this role to be
outside of their obligations in non-death penalty cases. Others do not believe that
presenting mitigating evidence about childhood trauma or abuse would be helpful
to their clients’ cases, or they do not have the time or knowledge to locate this
information.174 However, there is a growing recognition that “in order to fully
represent a client throughout all phases of the criminal justice system, they must
take on various roles, including counsel, advisor, social worker, educator, and
contract negotiator.”175 With regards to the time constraints making it virtually
impossible for many attorneys to uncover this information, a standard rendering
counsel ineffective for failing to adequately present this evidence may provide
leverage for indigent defense systems to advocate for additional funding so that
attorneys have sufficient resources to zealously represent their clients. At the same
time, it is important for attorneys to consider developing skills rooted in other
disciplines so that they are more equipped to gather mitigating information about
young clients
Criminal defense attorneys typically focus on selecting appropriate experts in
preparing mitigation evidence, and this is a critical piece of advocacy. However,
attorneys must do some initial groundwork in order to determine the type of experts
171. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4800-4813 (West 2012); CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2161-2167 (2003).
172. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 4, at 20, 28.
173. In a critique of therapeutic jurisprudence, Mae C. Quinn points out that the suggestion that
criminal defense attorneys should present mitigating evidence is not new. Failure to engage in this type
of advocacy renders an attorney’s performance “substandard” but more likely results from a lack of
resources rather than a commitment to a “‘traditional’ lawyering model.” Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to
Professor Wexler’s Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable to
Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 4, at 91,
117-18.
174. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty,
77 N.C. L. Rev. 1143, 1193-94 (1999).
175. Tamar M. Meekins, “Specialized Justice”: The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the
Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 4, at 46, 55.
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that should be appointed on a particular case. Further, the attorney is responsible
for providing relevant documents and information for the experts to consider.
Failure to gather comprehensive information about a client’s background severely
limits an attorney’s effectiveness.176 The most important starting point for
gathering mitigating information is generally the accused and his or her family
members. Although at first glance it may seem that it would be simple to obtain
information from one’s own client, research indicates that this process is more
complicated than it seems in that “[t]here is often a conspiracy of silence between
the youths and their family.”177 For example, study of fourteen juveniles who had
been sentenced to the death penalty (before the Roper decision outlawed capital
punishment for juvenile offenders) revealed that although each of the youth had
experienced severe abuse during their childhoods, their attorneys had not presented
this information either because they had not uncovered it or because the family
urged them not to make the information public.178 The following section discusses
some skills and techniques that may facilitate attorneys’ capacities to obtain
mitigating information about their clients.
A. Communicating Effectively with Young Clients
In Graham, the Supreme Court recognized that “[youth] are less likely than
adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense.”179 The Court
specifically cited juveniles’ limited understanding of the roles of various actors in
the justice system and a “reluctance to trust defense counsel” as “factors [that] are
likely to impair the quality of a juvenile defendant’s representation.”180 Attorneys
are not typically trained in skills focused on improving communication with
adolescent clients, but such skills are critical in terms of developing an
understanding of the client’s life.181 Though not the only source of information, the
client has intimate knowledge about his or her life that can help make sense of his
or her behavior.182 Developing open communication with a young client can
dramatically improve an attorney’s representation in court.
176. See Fedders, supra note 152, at 796 (discussing the systematic failure of juvenile delinquency
attorneys to gather necessary education or medical records, or to hire experts to evaluate their clients, in
order to make effective arguments at disposition hearings in juvenile court, in contrast to model rules
and standards).
177. Ellen Marrus & Irene Merker Rosenberg, Roper v. Simmons and Strickland v. Washington:
Dancing with Death, 42 No.2 CRIM. L. BULL. 153, 158 (2006).
178. Id.
179. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
180. Id.
181. See Ann Tobey, Thomas Grisso, & Robert Schwartz, Youths’ Trial Participation as Seen by
Youths and Their Attorneys: An Exploration of Competence-Based Issues, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 225, 241 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz
eds., 2002) (“Attorneys can be encouraged to think about ways to explain things to young people in
simpler terms . . . Mental health professionals, given their knowledge of developmental, clinical, and
applied interviewing strategies, are likely to be better prepared to teach lawyers these skills than are
other lawyers.”).
182. In Rompilla, the defendant’s lack of open communication with trial counsel limited counsel’s
awareness of mitigating information regarding his childhood. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381
(2005) (“Rompilla’s own contributions to any mitigation case were minimal. Counsel found him
uninterested in helping, as on their visit to his prison to go over a proposed mitigation strategy, when

2012]

APPEALING TO EMPATHY

417

The most effective approach to effectively communicating with young clients
runs counter to the typical communication style of attorneys. It requires investing
substantial amounts of time and using open-ended questions, rather than narrowly
tailored questions aimed at eliciting specific responses. As attorneys, we are
keenly focused on “relevant” information and tend to become impatient when
clients talk about “irrelevant” facts. However, it is often by listening to our client’s
seemingly “irrelevant” stories that we become aware of highly significant
information. Listening and trust-building techniques are emphasized in the fields
of social work and psychology as foundational skills. Attorneys who develop some
of these skills will be better prepared to obtain potentially helpful information
about their clients’ lives and traumatic experiences.
1. Building Rapport: Working Towards Trust
The first obstacle attorneys must overcome when representing youth is that
many juveniles may not trust their attorneys. Young offenders encounter various
professionals in the criminal justice system, and they often do not understand the
specific roles of each individual.183 The concept of attorney-client privilege is not
widely understood by adolescents. Further, many youth offenders are socialized to
distrust authority figures and to keep family affairs confidential. It is therefore
important for an attorney to spend time explaining her role, as well as the rules
governing confidentiality.
Developmental psychologists suggest specific
techniques such as using diagrams and examples to make the explanation of an
attorney’s role more concrete and, therefore, more likely to be understood by
adolescent clients. Emphasizing confidentiality is essential particularly given the
importance of peer groups in adolescence. Generally, youth in this developmental
stage are very concerned about peer acceptance. Those who are detained facing
serious charges are even more concerned about appearing “tough” among their
peers because their safety often depends on this reputation. Showing vulnerability
to other detained youth is seen as a sign of weakness that should be avoided at all
costs.
Thus, attorneys should reinforce the confidential nature of their
communications with their clients. Privacy during attorney-client interviews is of
utmost importance given the heightened confidentiality concerns among this
population. Furthermore, attorneys should explain the reasons behind asking about
personal experiences so that their young clients understand how this information
will be used in the case. By explaining the rationale behind presenting mitigating
Rompilla told them he was ‘bored being here listening’ and returned to his cell. To questions about
childhood and schooling, his answers indicated they had been normal, save for quitting school in the
ninth grade. There were times when Rompilla was even actively obstructive by sending counsel off on
false leads.”). The Supreme Court held that the attorneys should have continued to investigate by
obtaining school records and records from Rompilla’s prior incarcerations. Id. at 382. The decision
reinforces that obtaining information from one’s client is not the only way to uncover mitigating
information. At the same time, developing skills that make it more likely that one’s client will share
such information is a valuable endeavor. Rompilla’s trial counsel would have been in a better position
to continue investigating his childhood if the defendant had been more open in his communications.
183. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 (“Juveniles mistrust adults and have limited understandings of
the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it. They are less likely than
adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense.”).
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information and emphasizing that only the information that would be helpful to the
client’s case will be used by the attorney, clients may be more willing to share their
stories.
More importantly, however, the attorney must invest time in getting to know
the client. Once a trusting relationship is established, the information will flow.
Although an initial meeting may occur in the holding tanks or attorney interview
rooms in court buildings, frequent visits to meet with the client can go a long way
towards building trust.184 Rather than immediately asking a battery of personal
questions about a young person’s life history, it is more effective to spend time
talking about issues that interest the young person. This stage in a therapeutic
relationship is referred to as “building rapport” and is widely viewed as critical to
the effectiveness of future therapy. Typically, counselors devote the first two
counseling sessions to building rapport with clients. Skipping this step in the
process can cause the client to feel unsafe and to guard information. This is the
worst result for an attorney trying to illicit mitigating information. And yet, it is
very difficult for attorneys to find the time to devote to this stage in the process due
to the overwhelming caseloads of most public defenders and court appointed
attorneys.185
Most public defenders represent many more clients than
recommended by national guidelines and have so many cases that it is virtually
impossible to devote enough time to fully prepare each case.186 Hopefully, one of
the benefits of finding counsel ineffective for failing to adequately present
mitigating information would be that policy-makers would be forced to allocate
sufficient funding to indigent defense to bring caseloads down to recommended
levels. This would provide attorneys with the additional time that is necessary to
adequately prepare a defense.
Mitigating information often encompasses painful, traumatic experiences that a
client would rather not discuss with anyone, particularly a stranger. Asking clients
to discuss these issues is more akin to therapy than to traditional legal interviews
that focus on gathering factual information. By investing time in building rapport,
attorneys may be able to learn more about their clients’ personal experiences.
Consider, for example, my experiences with a female client who I visited
frequently in the juvenile hall where she was detained. During some visits, we
discussed how she was doing in school, issues with friends, and books she was
reading. Other times, we focused more specifically on issues relating to her legal
case. During informal conversations, I gathered pieces of information that
ultimately became quite important in her case. I found out that she had been
sexually abused in the gang she claimed membership in. She told me that she had
been on a drug binge for the months leading up to her crime, and that she wanted to
184. A survey of young offenders in Colorado revealed that, from the perspective of the youth, “more
time was needed with their lawyer to build trust, to enable their lawyer to know them as people, to be
listened to, [and] to share important information about themselves and the case.” ABA JUVENILE
JUSTICE CTR., YOUTH LAW CTR. & JUVENILE LAW CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 27 (2002),
available at www.njdc.info/pdf/cfjfull.pdf.
185. Id. at 8 (“T[t]he [national] assessment found high caseloads to be the single most important
barrier to effective representation” of juveniles).
186. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 153, at 10.
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get treatment for her drug addiction. I also learned that she was homeless at the
time of this incident because her mother had kicked her out of the family home.
After three months of these meetings, she told me, “You know what, Miss? I’m
going to tell you the reason my mom kicked me out. It’s because I told her that my
dad and my grandpa used to have sex with me when I was little.” Our unstructured
conversations provided me with mitigation evidence that could be presented in a
more organized, chronological fashion in a motion to the court. This information
also informed the choice of which experts would be most appropriate to appoint on
the case, which ultimately included a psychologist with an expertise in sexual
abuse.
2. Empathic, Non-Judgmental Listening Techniques
Listening in an open and non-judgmental way allows clients to feel
understood, creating an environment where they are more likely to share personal
information that is ultimately critical for attorneys to learn about. Reflective
listening, or paraphrasing what a client says, is an effective way to show that the
listener hears and understands the experiences of the speaker.187 This technique
puts the client in the role of the expert, thus minimizing obstacles to
communication that can otherwise result from cultural or generational
differences.188 Reflective listening requires avoiding providing advice, sharing a
personal opinion, or passing judgment. Rather, the listener focuses on what is
being said and explains what she hears. This technique may seem simple, but it
can be challenging to employ. Attorneys may have to fight the urge to offer legal
advice, or to tell the client that a particular statement is irrelevant to their defense.
However, it is worth investing time in this process. When people feel understood
rather than judged, they tend to open up even more. Thus, using reflective listening
techniques can help an attorney to learn more and, in turn, may dramatically impact
the presentation of a case.
Getting below the superficial information provided in an initial interview is
crucial. The following case study exemplifies the difference that interviewing
techniques can make. A sixteen-year-old young man was sentenced to serve
sixteen years in adult prison for an assault with a firearm. The social worker’s
report to the judge stated that the juvenile reported that he came from a stable,
supportive family. He mentioned that his father left the family for a period of time
because he was “doing his own thing.” The social worker did not delve into this
issue more deeply but instead reported the youth’s version of events verbatim to the
court. Based on a cursory interview with the young man, she concluded that he
was not amenable to treatment in juvenile court because he had plenty of
opportunities at home and had not taken advantage of them. The attorney had
spent very little time talking with his client and was unaware that there was much

187. See MARSHALL B. ROSENBERG, NONVIOLENT COMMUNICATION: A LANGUAGE OF LIFE (2d ed.
2003).
188. Kristin Henning, Defining the Lawyer-Self: Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Define the
Lawyer’s Role and Build Alliances that Aid the Child Client, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note
4, at 327, 340.
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more to the story, so the court made the sentencing decision based on this limited
information.
In reality, this young man’s mother became pregnant with him as the result of
rape; she told him that she wished she had aborted him. She left him in the care of
an abusive relative when he was one year old; he did not have adequate food or
basic necessities. He became ill and almost died as a baby. Beginning at the age of
three, he was sexually abused by a male family member who sodomized him on a
regular basis. The child was brought to the United States around the age of five,
however, his mother’s husband was resentful towards the child. The husband was
an alcoholic and would beat the child with a belt when he was intoxicated. He
would also regularly beat the mother until she bled in the presence of the child. At
the age of ten, the young man began to run away, feeling desperate to get away
from the violence and rejection at home. He was able to feel accepted in the
context of a gang, and he became a member at the age of twelve. His life history
paints quite a different picture than the summary provided by the social worker,
which illustrates the importance of cultivating trust and taking time to gather
information from young clients.
A teenage client will likely not immediately understand how personal, painful
experiences from the past relate to their current court case. Explaining this, and
creating a relationship that is conducive to sharing this type of information, is
therefore critical. Uncovering mitigating information often entails discussing
traumatic experiences. It is typical for people who have gone through trauma to
shut down when talking about their experiences. It may be helpful to back away
from a topic that a client seems unwilling or unable to discuss because it may be
more effective to come back to the topic at another time. An attorney’s role is not
to be the social worker, but the skills attorneys need in order to provide effective
legal representation to youth overlap with skills required of social workers.
Employing these techniques can improve the quality of legal advocacy that an
attorney is able to provide.
B. Partnering with Experts in Other Disciplines
Although attorneys regularly rely upon experts in criminal defense practice,
many attorneys do not appoint experts to generate information useful for plea
bargaining and sentencing, even in cases where juveniles are tried in adult court.189
Social workers support the work of attorneys in various legal contexts and are
particularly powerful allies for attorneys developing mitigating evidence.190 They
are trained to conduct “bio-psycho-social” assessments of people in order to
develop a holistic understanding of how biological, psychological, and
environmental factors have impacted an individual’s life. This framework is useful
in gathering mitigating information about clients because of its comprehensive
nature. “Mitigation specialists” are generally hired in capital cases. Their role is to
help the attorney gather and present the type of evidence discussed in this Article.
Similarly, attorneys representing juveniles facing adult sentences may consider
189. Marty Beyer, supra note 3, at 206 (“most juveniles whose cases are filed directly in adult court
(without a transfer hearing) do not have expert testimony prior to or at the sentencing hearing”).
190. Meekins, supra note 82, at 151 (referencing the role of social workers in drug courts).
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partnering with a mitigation specialist who has expertise in gathering such
information.
The Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Office employs psychiatric social
workers who partner with attorneys to prepare psycho-social history reports for
clients facing transfer from juvenile to adult court. This team of social workers
functions as mitigation specialists for these juvenile offenders, using therapeutic
skills to interview clients, their family members, and others to obtain detailed
information about the client’s life experiences. The social worker ultimately writes
a report highlighting the mitigating information in a young client’s life. This
partnership is an effective model that could be incorporated into the representation
of youth in adult courts throughout the country.
Attorneys must also become familiar with the wide range of issues that may
impact their young clients in order to appoint appropriate experts to present
additional mitigating information to the court. Biological factors such as exposure
to drugs or alcohol while in utero or traumatic injuries may impact an individual’s
development. Accordingly, these are important issues for an attorney to explore.
Fetal alcohol spectrum disorder is particularly important to look for because of its
prevalence and implications for young offenders. One study found that fetal
alcohol spectrum disorder impacts 24% of young offenders in custody.191 The
disorder impacts cognitive functioning, can result in a wide range of developmental
and mental health disorders, and can impact decision-making.192
Neuropsychologists may be particularly helpful experts to investigate whether a
particular client has a fetal alcohol spectrum diagnosis.193 Mental health issues are
similarly important to explore, and attorneys may want to appoint a psychologist
and/or psychiatrist to conduct an evaluation. An attorney who is familiar with her
client’s unique experiences and characteristics will be better suited to select experts
whose expertise relates most closely to the client’s issues.
C. Obtaining Records
In the capital context, attorneys obtain school records, records from prior
incarcerations, and documentations of a history of alcoholism or substance
abuse.194 These types of records can provide a wealth of information about a
client’s life experiences and often contain extensive mitigating evidence. School
records, for example, may contain information about learning disabilities,
developmental disabilities, and a child’s exposure to abuse or neglect in the home.
Such records can be important in developing a diagnosis and can also be used to
highlight systemic failures in a child’s life. If a child demonstrated signs of a
learning disability that was never diagnosed, or if a disability was diagnosed but the
school did not provide appropriate educational services, this information can be

191. David Boulding, Fetal Alcohol and the Law, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 4, at
186, 187 (indicating that experts estimate that it may actually impact 40% of this population).
192. Id.
193. Boulding recommends a multi-disciplinary team comprised of a pediatrician, neuropsychologist, speech pathologist, occupational therapist, physical therapist, general practitioner, and a
psychologist to diagnose fetal alcohol spectrum disorders. Id. at 190.
194. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005).
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helpful in distributing blame among various social institutions rather than merely
on the shoulders of the child. Medical records can also be quite telling. Birth
records generally indicate whether a child is born with drugs in his system, or
whether the mother consumed alcohol during pregnancy. Childhood medical
records may contain information about physical injuries consistent with abuse or
neglect. Referrals to Child Protective Services may also be noted in school or
medical records, which can in turn lead to additional evidence. A client may not
even be aware of relevant records in the custody of Child Protective Services, so it
is generally a good idea to request such records. Mental health records should also
be obtained if they exist. Records from any detention centers where a young
person has been confined may also contain helpful information and can highlight
additional professionals who should be interviewed as potential witnesses.
Evidence of good behavior and participation in rehabilitative efforts, for example,
can be useful to present at a sentencing hearing. Counsel has been found to be
ineffective for failing to adequately investigate records in a death penalty case.195
Given the wealth of information contained in these sources, a similar requirement
makes sense in the juvenile context.
VI. CONCLUSION
Juveniles prosecuted in adult courts face serious consequences – including
spending the rest of their lives in prison – despite their immaturity and often
traumatic upbringings. The Supreme Court has recognized the categorical
diminished culpability of adolescents. The culpability of some young offenders is
particularly diminished because of the details of their lives. It is critical for
attorneys to uncover and present mitigating information at sentencing hearings
because such information may have an impact on the rest of their young clients’
lives. Unfortunately, the deficient representation of juvenile offenders is widely
recognized. Although professional standards point to the importance of attorneys
gathering and presenting mitigating evidence regarding juvenile clients, many fail
to do so. Recognizing ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the grounds that
counsel failed to adequately present such information would encourage attorneys to
comport with the professional standards and would give those juveniles who did
not receive adequate assistance some recourse on appeal (or through a writ of
habeas corpus). This approach would be consistent with adolescent development
principles and would be in line with the Supreme Court’s recognition that
adolescents are fundamentally different than adults and that their behavior should
be assessed in light of their lessened moral culpability.
While presenting evidence of mitigation is important, there are inherent
limitations to this approach. Some sentencing schemes do not allow for judicial
discretion, and courts are not able to impose shorter prison sentences even when
faced with compelling reasons. In other cases, reduced sentences still bring about
injustice. A juvenile whose sentence is reduced from eighty years to fifty years
will likely not feel that the lower sentence is substantially different. However,
uncovering the tragic information about young offenders’ histories and forcing

195. Id.
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courts to wrestle with the complexities of these young people’s lives may
ultimately cultivate a greater sensitivity to the needs of this population which—
over time—has the potential to transform our approach to juvenile justice. Rather
than demonizing these young men and women, our society may be able to
recognize their humanity and to craft public policies with this in mind. Developing
empathy across deeply entrenched boundaries of race and class is an important
foundation for working towards justice. As Michelle Alexander notes in The New
Jim Crow, “[i]f we had actually learned to show love, care, compassion, and
concern across racial lines during the Civil Rights Movement—rather than go
colorblind—mass incarceration would not exist today.”196 Viewed from this
perspective, cultivating empathy by presenting mitigating evidence has an
important role to play in terms of the larger movement to end our overreliance on
incarceration.

196. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010).

